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Abstract This paper advocates for actively minimising the price of bank resolution at each part of the new regulatory 
banking structure. It does so by examining how the banking resolution costs were increased due to 
decisions taken at different stages of the regime during the experience of Cyprus with bank supervision, 
early intervention, resolution and liquidation. The paper then moves on to argue that increasing instead of 
decreasing the lingering bank resolution costs in Cyprus tainted the picture of bank resolution success for 
which the Cypriot experience has become somewhat of a posterchild. It argues that if the success of bank 
resolution is evaluated after a series of bad supervisory decisions, it is more than likely to conclude that 
resolution was successful because it resolved a very detrimental situation. Simply put, the success of the 
Cypriot bank resolution might as well equate to a gigantic failure of bank supervision. As such, while 
acknowledging the benefits and successes of the new regime, this paper tries to showcase that the 
application of the supervisory and resolution regime in Cyprus hides a lot of elements that are very far 
from successful, but which can nevertheless form constructive lessons for the practical application of the 
regime in the future. 
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in - Cyprus 
Footnote Information This paper was prepared for the ‘A Dynamic Economic Monetary Union’ (ADEMU) Workshop (11 
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of core interest to the case of Cyprus. 
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9 Abstract This paper advocates for actively minimising the price of bank resolution 
10 at each part of the new regulatory banking structure. It does so by examining how 
11 the banking resolution costs were increased due to decisions taken at different stages 
12 of the regime during the experience of Cyprus with bank supervision, early inter- 
13 vention,  resolution  and  liquidation.  The  paper  then  moves  on  to  argue  that 
14 increasing instead of  decreasing the  lingering  bank  resolution  costs in  Cyprus 
15 tainted the picture of bank resolution success for which the Cypriot experience has 
16 become somewhat of a posterchild. It argues that if the success of bank resolution is 
17 evaluated after a series of bad supervisory decisions, it is more than likely to 
18 conclude that resolution was successful because it resolved a very detrimental sit- 
19 uation. Simply put, the success of the Cypriot bank resolution might as well equate 
20 to a gigantic failure of bank supervision. As such, while acknowledging the benefits 
21 and successes of the new regime, this paper tries to showcase that the application of 
22 the supervisory and resolution regime in Cyprus hides a lot of elements that are very 
23 far from successful, but which can nevertheless form constructive lessons for the 
24 practical application of the regime in the future. 
25 
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31 1 Introduction 
 
32 The experience of Cyprus with bank ‘resolution’1 in 2013,2 2014,3 and 20154 carries 
33 many lessons and insights with regards to the practical application of the bank 
34 resolution regime as it currently stands in the Banking Union.5  This paper focuses 
35 on what is possibly the most important such lesson that emerged. Namely: the need 
36 for reaping the advantages of the ‘holistic’ approach in bank regulation under the 
37 Banking Union by exercising supervision, early intervention, resolution and post- 
38 resolution in a way that seeks to collectively reduce the price of bank resolutions 
39 from the outset and throughout each pillar, before a credit institution actually needs 
40 to be recapitalised or resolved. 
41 The Cypriot experience signals the passage from an era of bail-outs to an era of 
42 bail-ins.  Cyprus  was  the  first  case  where  a  ‘bail-in’  was  imposed  within  the 
43 European Union, in the spirit of shifting the burden of dealing with troubled banks 
44 onto the banks’ creditors instead of the tax-payers. However, despite this shift in 
45 burden, it is evident that failures in supervision and resolution still had a massive 
46 impact not only on the bank’s creditors who were called to recapitalise the banks 
47 through the bail-in tool, but also on the economic output of the country, and, as 
48 such, on the public.6  Even if not directly taxed to bail out the banks, the public is 
49 still burdened indirectly, either through the direct consequences to the country’s 
50 diminishing  economic  output  such  as  perishing  wages,  increased  prices,  or 
 
 
1FL01 1   Under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), Art. 1(1) ‘resolution’ is defined as the 
1FL02 application of a resolution tool or a tool referred to in Art. 37(9) in order to achieve one or more of the 
1FL03 resolution objectives referred to in Art. 31(2). For instance, the institution is failing but ‘resolving it’, as 
1FL04 opposed to letting it fail under ordinary liquidation, is considered to be in the ‘public interest’ (a term that 
1FL05 is explained later on); Boccuzzi (2016), p. 69 defines resolution as ‘the set of tools aimed at reorganising 
1FL06 and  restructuring  the  bank’;  Combining  these  definitions  gives  us  that  bank  resolution  provides 
1FL07 administrative powers of intervention which are designed to either restructure a bank (e.g. by transferring 
1FL08 assets and bailing-in its creditors and shareholders) or to effect its ‘orderly’ wind-down, i.e. its resolution 
1FL09 ‘without severe systemic disruptions’ and without socializing the losses of credit institutions through bail- 
1FL10 outs. See Financial Stability Board, Preamble para. 1, p. 3. 
2FL01 2   The restructuring of the Bank of Cyprus and the resolution of Laiki Popular Bank through resolution 
2FL02 and restructuring measures and the recapitalisation of Hellenic Bank and the Cooperative Banks through 
2FL03 private and public funds respectively. 
3FL01 3   Resolution Decree of the Central Bank of Cyprus No. 356/14 issued on 21 July 2014 applying 
3FL02 resolution measures in respect to the Cyprus Branch of FBME Bank Ltd after the US’s FinCEN alleged 
3FL03 that the FBME carried out money laundering operations through its branches in Cyprus. 
4FL01 4   With regards to the Cooperative Bank. 
5FL01 5   ‘Banking Union’ refers  to  the  centralization  of  rule-making  and  decision-making instruments of 
5FL02 banking policy on the supranational level. The Banking Union rests on four pillars. The first is the SSM 
5FL03 which brings the supervision of euro area banks, directly or indirectly, under the auspices and control of 
5FL04 the ECB and caters for early intervention measures to prevent future crises. The second is the Single 
5FL05 Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which brings the resolution of euro area banks, directly or indirectly, 
5FL06 within the competence of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and establishes a Single Resolution Fund 
5FL07 (SRF) to support resolution. The third is harmonised deposit guarantee scheme. The fourth is the Single 
5FL08 Rulebook  which  includes  the  substantive  rules  of  prudential  regulation  and  resolution  of  credit 
5FL09 institutions. See Grundmann (2015). 
6FL01 6   Indeed, output losses inflicted by banking crises on the economy are found to be generally vast (e.g. 
6FL02 Boyd et al. (2005)), and often impossible to be regained (e.g. Cerra and Saxena (2008)). 
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51 diminished supply of credit,7  or through being bailed-in to recapitalise/resolve the 
52 bank, since the bank’s creditors to a large extent are the same persons as the 
53 taxpayers. 
54 Both these indirect ways of burdening the public can resonate long after a bank 
55 resolution is completed. Firstly, this is because an impaired economic cycle (i.e. a 
56 negatively  affected  national  primary balance  and an increased cost of borrow- 
57 ing/cost of interest payments) can amplify the downturn of the economic activity 
58 and  the  degree  of  activation  of  automatic  fiscal  stabilisers,  such  as  increased 
59 unemployment benefits, reduction in tax revenues and increases in interest rate 
60 expenses. This effectively stalls the speed of recovery, since the country will be in a 
61 financial position that is disadvantageous to boosting economic activity.8 Secondly, 
62 if bailed in, the creditors/taxpayers are likely to pursue judicial redress by seeking to 
63 establish  that  the  bail-in  interfered  with  their  property  rights.  However,  such 
64 proceedings are most likely going to be unsuccessful given the disheartening ruling 
65 of the European Court of Justice in the Ledra case where it was held that any 
66 resolution tool imposed is likely to be justified as a ‘tolerable’ and ‘proportionate’ 
67 interference in the face of the ‘imminent risk of financial losses to which depositors 
68 […] would have been exposed if the [bank] had failed’. The Court’s eagerness to 
69 base, rather tacitly, the existence of a public interest to ‘uphold the stability of the 
70 banking  system’  on  an  unfounded  conjecture  that  the  ‘no  creditor  worse  off’ 
71 principle applies, without materially considering the potential losses of the creditors 
72 if the bank in question was indeed instead liquidated, reduces the pursuing of such 
73 proceedings to a waste of more time and money—stretching the duration and depth 
74 of the indirect ways in which taxpayers/creditors are affected.9  This is despite the 
75 fact that the ruling was delivered two long years after the imposition of the bail-in in 
76 Cyprus. 
77 The Cypriot case’s inability to shield the taxpayers from being affected indirectly 
78 demonstrates how the idea of a clean, prompt, resolution without involving the 
79 taxpayer, solely by shifting the burden to the creditors and over-relying on the 
80 resolution stage to fix the problems, is unrealistic no matter how desirable it may be. 
81 Instead, a holistic approach to bank regulation—with supervision and resolution 
82 working in concert from the outset and continuously thereafter to minimise both the 
83 indirect consequences and the costs of a potential resolution/recapitalisation—is 
84 thought to be essential for truly managing successfully any future banking crises. 
85 For this reason, it is argued that while the debate on the cost of bank resolution 
86 has mostly focused on the resolution stage of dealing with banks and on the tools to 
 
 
7FL01 7   Baglioni (2016), p. 9 points out that there are two channels through which banking crises can impact the 
7FL02 public: (1) a direct channel, including governmental measures to support distressed banks (e.g. bailouts) 
7FL03 in order to avoid liquidation and/or limit the costs to bank stakeholders, particularly depositors and 
7FL04 bondholders, and (2) an indirect channel, including all the other ways a banking crisis can negatively 
7FL05 affect the primary balance and the interest expenses of the public sector, i.e. negatively affect the 
7FL06 economic cycle, by causing a fall to the supply of credit and in assets’ values. See also Clerides (2014), 
7FL07 p. 32. 
8FL01 8   Baglioni (2016), p. 9. 
9FL01 9   See Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v. European Commission 
9FL02 and European Central Bank (ECB) (20 September 2016). 
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87 be  used to  finance/recapitalise resolution and  bank restructuring,10   supervision, 
88 early intervention, resolution, and post-resolution, all make up the eventual price of 
89 bank resolution during and after its completion since decisions taken at each stage 
90 can affect the level of the economic downturn and the percentage of bail-in needed 
91 for recapitalizing/resolving the bank. As such, all the stages of the new regime 
92 should work in concert to minimise the costs and losses.11 
93 Cyprus exemplifies that not taking advantage of this concerted approach, and 
94 relying instead excessively on the resolution stage to fix the problems after a trail of 
95 supervisory and other failures, leads to an exponential increase of the losses which 
96 in turn triggers the need for deeper haircuts to recapitalise and resolve the troubled 
97 banks.12 Just as an indication to that extent, after long delays in taking action to deal 
98 with the  failing  banks  (supervisory &  institutional  failures13),  and  limited  and 
99 ineffective use of early intervention and preventative measures in dealing with 
100 troubled banks (supervisory failures), the percentage of bail-in imposed reached the 
101 order of 47,5% of the uninsured depositors (the main creditor base) in the Bank of 
102 Cyprus (the restructured bank), while uninsured deposits were wiped out in the 
103 Laiki Bank (the resolved bank). These failures made resolution the best/cheapest 
104 option by default—with no thorough assessment to that regard other than who was 
105 to bear the costs directly. 
106 It is apparent that actions taken at different stages of the supervision/resolution 
107 regime had a direct impact on the aggregate eventual losses of resolving the Cypriot 
108 banks. And these losses were largely absorbed by depositors—the class of creditors 
109 that coincides the greatest with tax-payers. Therefore, it is submitted that while 
110 resolution is capable of mitigating a detrimental situation, as the Cypriot experience 
111 has shown, it cannot make up for the losses already accumulated due to poor prior 
112 decision-making. In this regard, Cyprus arguably exemplifies how not to apply the 
113 new regime.  Instead of  idolising the  merits of  burden-shifting for the  sake of 
114 burden-shifting and focusing solely on resolution, or solely on supervision for that 
115 matter,14   future cases should focus on taking advantage of the full scope of the 
116 regime which targets the minimization of the immediate and long-term costs that 
117 stem from failing banks in general—regardless of who pays the bill—at every stage 
118 of the Banking Union’s pillars. 
119 This paper argues that only such a holistic approach, if executed properly and not 
120 the way it was executed in Cyprus, can be truly successful in safeguarding the 
121 interests of the taxpayers and the interests of the economies that experience the 
 
10FL01    10   See Hadjiemmanuil (2015); Hellwig (2014); Yiatrou (2016). 
11FL01    11   See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), stressing the need for: (i) early intervention and 
11FL02    use of recovery and resolution tools; (ii) improving supervisory processes (e.g. incorporating macro- 
11FL03    prudential assessments, stress testing and business model analysis); (iii) dealing with liquidity shortfalls, 
11FL04    risk concentrations, and misaligned compensation schemes; and, (iv) further guidelines on information- 
11FL05    sharing and cooperation of relevant authorities. 
12FL01    12   If formal resolution is to be considered at all at that point. 
13FL01    13   Institutional failure due to the lack of a pre-existing regime to deal with the crisis to enable prompt 
13FL02    action. 
14FL01    14   See Clerides (2014), noting that supervision ‘is not an exact science’ and as such it cannot dodge all 
14FL02    future bank failures. Therefore, focusing solely on supervision would also be insufficient. 
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122 resolution and restructuring of their banks, and, as such, in achieving the objectives 
123 of the Banking Union. To showcase how the regime can live up to the potential of 
124 its intended holistic approach, the paper starts by examining how supervision, early 
125 intervention, and resolution, respectively, can minimise the immediate and long- 
126 term costs stemming from bank resolutions (Sect. 2). In doing so, examples of 
127 actions and inactions that increased instead of decreased the costs in the Cypriot 
128 banks’ resolution are provided to argue that the Cypriot case failed to truly harvest 
129 the benefits of such a holistic approach (Sect. 2). Section 3 then discusses on this 
130 basis why Cyprus was unsuccessful in applying the holistic standard advocated. 




132 2 Cost of Banking Resolution:  A Holistic Approach 
 
133 The  objectives  of  the  Banking  Union  are  to  establish  a  single  regulatory, 
134 supervisory,  and  bank  resolution  structure  that  minimises  the  likelihood  and 
135 severity of  future banking crises—thus lessening their  potential  impact  on EU 
136 economies and taxpayers, while at the same time increasing banking competitive- 
137 ness  by  reducing  fragmentation  and  maintaining  the  stability  of  the  financial 
138 system—and, in turn, restores confidence in the financial sector to contribute to 
139 economic recovery.15  In other words, they are essentially already prescribing the 
140 advocated holistic approach for minimising the costs of a potential bank resolution. 
141 In order to achieve these objectives, the regime allows ample room for discretion, 
142 whether  at  the  national  or  at  the  European  level,  by  adopting  a  minimum 
143 harmonisation approach with ‘soft triggers’16 instead of outright ‘hard triggers’17 for 
144 many critical decisions. In particular, soft triggers are adopted for the triggering of 
145 resolution, and a mixture of soft and hard triggers are adopted for early intervention 
146 measures.18  It follows that, discretion in the decision-making at all the stages of the 
147 new regime is instrumental in shaping the aggregate costs of resolution, and as such 
148 in achieving the holistic approach prescribed to limit the costs from the outset, 
149 leading to more efficient future resolutions with less casualties. For instance, the 
150 decisions of the supervisory authorities for early intervention measures can avoid an 
151 eventual  resolution  altogether;  the  discretion  in  the  evaluation  of  whether 
152 liquidation or resolution are more beneficial for the public interest will determine 
153 what the ultimate losses on the creditors will be; the evaluation of whether creditors 
154 are better or worse off in resolution than under ordinary liquidation will determine 
155 whether the  resolution fund will need to  compensate creditors post resolution, 
156 increasing as such the cost of resolution, etc. 
 
15FL01    15   European Commission (2014), p. 76. 
16FL01    16   Boccuzzi (2016), p. 66 defines a ‘soft triggers’ approach as an approach based on an evaluation of the 
16FL02    supervisory authority with regards to current or prospective (actual or potential) non-compliance with 
16FL03    prudential requirements—the same approach pre-existed under Art. 136 of the Credit Ratings Directive 
16FL04    (CRD). 
17FL01    17   Ibid., in a  ‘hard triggers’ approach only predefined quantitative thresholds signalling the bank’s 
17FL02    technical situation, such as capital, leverage, and liquidity, qualify as triggers for intervention. 
18FL01    18   Ibid., p. 168. 
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157 This  section  explores  the  importance  of  discretion  in  supervision,  early 
158 intervention, triggering of resolution, choosing between liquidation and resolution, 
159 and choosing the resolution tools to be applied in calibrating the price of bank 
160 resolution not only prior and during resolution, but also in the aftermath of its 
161 execution. As such, it provides a guide of how to use discretion to facilitate the 
162 holistic approach advocated for. In doing so, it argues that, in the case of Cyprus, 
163 discretion  was  regrettably  used  to  exacerbate  the  costs  and  hide  the  failures, 
164 bringing  to  the  surface  the  adverse  consequences  of  not  following  a  holistic 
165 approach in bank regulation. 
 
 
166 2.1 Cost of Prevention: The Role of Supervision 
 
167 Supervision is important for minimising costs and losses because it is responsible 
168 for: ensuring resolvability and bail-in ability at all times in order to apply prompt 
169 and smooth resolution minimising systemic ripple effects;19  avoiding failures in the 
170 first place; and, in the event that failures do occur, rebuilding the competitiveness of 
171 the banking sector and reducing the long-term losses from resolution. 
 
 
172 2.1.1 Supervision: Rebuilding Competitiveness of the Banking Sector 
 
173 In post-restructuring and resolution countries, supervision is most important for 
174 regaining the investors’ trust in order to rebuild the banking sector’s competitive- 
175 ness. Regaining this trust however is an incredibly difficult task given that the same 
176 supervisory  authority  has  already  proven  itself  to  be  incapable  of  effectively 
177 supervising the banks it was responsible for. 
178 To re-establish competitiveness in a ‘crisis’ country, supervision must actively 
179 and vigorously apply the relevant international and European standards20   to the 
180 fullest effect  in  order to  benefit from the  levelled  playing field, integrity,  and 
181 stability that regulatory convergence (i.e. one-size-fits-all) can offer. Therefore, 
182 demanding requirements and capital buffers that can achieve competitiveness are 
183 not  treated  with  hostility.  On  the  contrary,  setting  such  vigorous  standards is 
184 welcomed given how crucial it is for countries that restructure their banks to get it 
 
19FL01    19   Krahnen and Moretti (2015), p. 147; Joosen (2015), pp. 175-235. 
20FL01    20   Said standards are provided under the array of rules which govern the prudential regulation of credit 
20FL02    institutions under the single banking rule-book. These substantives rules are already contained in the 
20FL03    Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)—both 
20FL04    implementing Basel III. See Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) [2013] OJ L 176/338 and Regulation (EU) 
20FL05    No. 575/2013 (CRR) [2013] OJ L 176/1. According to Professor Grundman the Single Rulebook, on the 
20FL06    basis of EU regulations and directives, is aimed at a truly uniform supervisory practice, akin to a 
20FL07    handbook on uniform supervision practice. See Grundmann (2015). See also Reports on the Observance 
20FL08    of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), which summarize the extent to  which countries observe certain 
20FL09    internationally  recognized  standards  and  codes.  The  IMF  has  recognized 12  areas  and  associated 
20FL10    standards as useful for the operational work of the Fund and the World Bank. These comprise of: 
20FL11    accounting; auditing; anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT); 
20FL12    banking supervision; corporate governance; data  dissemination; fiscal  transparency; insolvency and 
20FL13    creditor rights; insurance supervision; monetary and financial policy transparency; payments systems; and 
20FL14    securities regulation. 
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185 right, since ‘failure would throw all confidence-building measures into reverse, with 
186 incalculable consequences’.21 
187 The  Central  Bank  of  Cyprus  (the  national  supervisory  authority)  seems  to 
188 acknowledge this fact since Cyprus is one of the two southern European countries 
189 (along with Malta) which has not set the countercyclical capital buffer for Other 
190 Significant  Financial  Institutions  (O-SIFIs)  at  0%,22    and  since  it  rushed  to 
191 immediately  place  the  Federal  Bank  of  Middle  East  (FBME)  under  special 
192 administration   and   subsequently   resolution   following   suspicions   of   money 
193 laundering by the Financial Crime Enforcement Network of the US Department 
194 of Treasury (FinCEN). This demonstrates that it is no longer the constant thrill of 
195 higher earnings that takes priority in countries hit by the crisis. On the contrary, in 
196 order to regain trust and allow growth, crisis countries have to focus on constantly 
197 proving their  resilience through a  continuous process of  benchmarking against 
198 international best practices for economic stability and service quality.23 
199 Having said  that,  when applying one-size-fits-all policies, special attention 
200 must  be  paid  to  the  state  of  the  economic  cycle  and  the  political  economic 
201 considerations at play.24   For instance, the across the board capital exercise by 
202 the EBA that marked to market sovereign debt had disastrous effects for the 
203 financial stability of a country with pre-existing problems such as Cyprus. In 
204 Cyprus, the timing of the EBA’s capital exercise meant that higher Core Equity 
205 Tier  1  (CET  1)  requirements  were  applied  pro-cyclically.  The  banks  were 
206 required to  build up  their  CET  1  buffer  in  order to  make  up  the  difference 
207 between market and book value of government debt to reach the required 9% of 
208 CET 1 within 9 months. Simultaneously, it was decided to involve the private 
209 sector in restructuring the Greek debt (Greek Private Sector Involvement (PSI)), 
210 wiping out essentially about 80% of the value of Greek debt that the private 
211 sector held.25  This meant that the Cypriot banks, which were deeply affected by 
212 the PSI26   and did not receive any liquidity support to deal with these losses, 
213 were now required to also build up their equity base within 9 months.27  The fact 
214 that the country had been out of the markets for 5 months already, made raising 
215 additional capital, which the two troubled Cypriot banks had already done in 
 
21FL01    21   Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus Banking Sector (ICFCBS) (2013), p. 39. 
22FL01    22   See Schoenmaker and Veron (2016), pp. 7-8 stating that ‘Most northern member states generally apply 
22FL02    higher systemic buffers of up to 2% or 3%, while southern member states (except Cyprus and Malta) 
22FL03    apply low systemic buffers of up to 1%. Remarkable cases are Italy and Latvia, which have set the 
22FL04    systemic buffer for other systemically important institutions at 0%, with only a G-SIB surcharge of 1% 
22FL05    for UniCredit following the Financial Stability Board’s guidance.’ 
23FL01    23   ICFCBS (2013), p. 33, para. 5.5.12. 
24FL01    24   Michaelides (2014), p. 667. 
25FL01    25   EU Council on 26-27 October 2011. 
26FL01    26   Orphanides (2013) stating that for Cyprus, the write-down of Greek debt was between 4.5 and 5 billion 
26FL02    euro. 
27FL01    27   Michaelides (2014), p. 667, noting that while Admati and Hellwig (2013) argue that this decision made 
27FL02    the European banking system safer by rapidly implementing higher capital ratios within nine months, 
27FL03    ‘[t]his is not true in the case of Cyprus’; Orphanides (2013), completely refuting Admati and Hellwig 
27FL04    (2013), states that ‘That famous capital exercise created the capital crunch in the euro area which is the 
27FL05    cause of the recession we’ve had in the euro area for the last 2 years.’ 
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216 2009, 2010 and even as late as early 2011, much harder.28  This combination of 
217 the haircut and the stress test left the two largest Cypriot banks in need of about 
218 2 billion euro of additional capital.29  Since the banks had just lost more than 4.5 
219 billion in the Greek PSI, it is evident that the banks did not require assistance 
220 before these badly-timed regulatory interventions.30 
221 To  sum  up,  while  one-size-fits-all policies  are  beneficial  counter-cyclically, 
222 especially  for  increasing  competition  in  post-crisis  countries  by  earmarking 
223 regulatory  convergence,  one-size-fits-all  policies  do  not  actually  fit  all  when 
224 fragility  is  present.  Thus,  discretion  should  be  exercised  to  avoid  unintended 
225 consequences from the application of one-size-fits-all policies during crises.31 
 
 
226 2.1.2 Supervision: Ensuring Resolvability32 
 
227 Resolvability rests largely upon three factors. Firstly, on setting out and enforcing 
228 sufficient capital requirements to ensure that the bank has enough capital to absorb 
229 losses for financing its resolution and recapitalisation. Secondly, on drafting and 
230 updating viable resolution plans to be followed swiftly if the need for resolution 
231 arises.  Thirdly,  on  the  local  government  cooperating  in  supporting  formal 
232 resolutions and in keeping the costs of formal resolutions down by maintaining a 
233 solid fiscal position and implementing structural adjustments if needed in order to 
234 maintain confidence in its ultimate backstop abilities and enable the banks to build 
235 up their capital cushion in case that becomes necessary—something that the Cypriot 
236 government did not do.33 
237 Supervisory and resolution authorities are crucial in conducting the ground work 
238 for resolvability by calculating and assessing the level and quality of loss absorbing 
239 capital for each bank supervised, as well as drafting viable resolution plans, so as to 
240 credibly cater for the speedy application of a formal resolution, if need be, at a 
241 future time. The sufficiency of the loss absorbing capital involves the level of equity 
242 and bail-inable debt needed to ensure adequate loss absorption based on the size and 
243 risk of the institution in question (the minimum requirement for own funds and 
244 eligible liabilities MREL),34  and its quality, i.e. the loss-absorption ability of the 
 
28FL01    28   Orphanides (2013), p. 4. If EFSF/ESM were available for direct recapitalization of banks instead of 
28FL02    asking each government to be responsible for the capitalization, the government losing access to the 
28FL03    markets would not have affected the banks in raising additional capital. However, in the absence of such 
28FL04    arrangements the adverse feedback loop existing between banks and sovereigns meant that removing the 
28FL05    possibility of the implicit guarantee made it practically impossible for banks to raise additional capital. 
29FL01    29   Ibid. 
30FL01    30   Ibid. 
31FL01    31   See Michaelides (2014). 
32FL01    32   Please refer to Peter Brierley’s paper in the same volume for an extensive account of resolvability. 
33FL01    33   Orphanides (2013), pp. 2, 49. 
34FL01    34   Or Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) if the institution is considered to be a Globally Significant 
34FL02    Financial Institution (G-SIFI); See Krahnen and Moretti (2015), pp. 136, 142-146, while sympathising 
34FL03    with Admati and Hellwig (2013a) who argue for a 20-30% risk unweighted equity ratio to ensure a much 
34FL04    larger Loss Absorbing Capacity (LAC) in bank balance sheets, they emphasize the added value of having 
34FL05    bail-in debt as part of the LAC—in addition to equity. 
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245 banks’ subordinated creditors35 which ensures that a necessary bail-in can be carried 
246 out without the fear of systemic risk repercussions. This entails calibrating the risk 
247 of a bank run by the investors holding the loss absorbing capital by determining the 
248 equity and bail-in debt positions—i.e. determining which investors are long in these 
249 assets, whether they are located inside or outside the banking system, and whether 
250 there is any prospect of re-transferring the risk into the banking system. 
251 It follows that establishing and monitoring the effectiveness of bail-in provisions 
252 requires strenuous supervisory action, and thus, has real and continuous costs.36 
253 However,  if  resolvability  is  not  established  at  the  supervisory  stage,  formal 
254 resolutions will be avoided due to fears of their potential systemic repercussions. 
255 Such an effect would set back the Banking Union’s vision by paving the way for 
256 bailouts in the future. In fact, in order to avoid not only the moral hazard of informal 
257 resolutions and bailouts but also the moral hazard of formal resolutions as opposed 
258 to  liquidations, the  EBA’s  Regulatory  and  Technical  Standards  on  Resolution 
259 Planning37  and the Guidelines on measures to reduce or remove impediments on 
260 resolvability,38    propose  that  resolution  authorities  verify  the  feasibility  and 
261 credibility  of  liquidation  and  its  consistency  with  the  public  interest,  before 




263 2.1.3 Supervision: Avoiding Failures in the First Place 
 
264 Clearly, the preference is that supervision is robust from the outset to help avoid and 
265 minimise the cost of resolution—a task which the Cypriot supervisory authorities 
266 failed spectacularly in fulfilling. While Cyprus is often quoted as a case of bank 
267 resolution success, it is also arguably a case of the greatest supervisory failure in 
268 terms of the supervision’s role in avoiding, or at least not intensifying, crises. 
269 The four supervisory actions that seem to have negatively affected the cost of the 
270 eventual resolutions the most are: (a) policies inducing a surge in loans; (b) the 
271 Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) provided to the two largest Cypriot banks 
272 by the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC);39 (c) the approval of the merge of the Cypriot 
273 and Greek operations of the Laiki Bank effectively converting the Greek operations 
274 of Laiki from ‘subsidiary’ to ‘branch’ status in March 2011, and; (d) the delay of 
275 seeking assistance even after the Greek Private Sector Involvement (PSI). 
 
 
276 2.1.3.1 CBC  Policies   That  Allowed  Surge  in  Real  Estate   Loans Between 
277 2010-2012 the  CBC  relaxed  the  liquidity  standards which  allowed a  dramatic 
278 increase in loans to real estate. Indicatively, in 2011 loans to the housing sector 
279 amounted to 150% of GDP, and were given based on collateral rather than on the 
 
35FL01    35   Ibid., p. 142. 
36FL01    36   Ibid., pp. 125-126. 
37FL01    37   EBA (2014a), p. 3. 
38FL01    38   EBA (2014c), p. 10. 
39FL01    39   An application to ELA becomes the subject of examination by the central national bank and is required 
39FL02    to be approved by the ECB Governing Council with two-thirds majority. 
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280 cash flows of the borrowers.40 The CBC’s effort to counteract this dramatic increase 
281 by introducing a 10% increase in the down payment requirement on second homes 
282 in 200741 was condemned as limiting loans and growth. Consequently, it only lasted 
283 one  year,  limiting  any  potentially  positive  effects  that  it  might  have  had  and 
284 showcasing the political influence the CBC was under. 
 
285 2.1.3.2 Emergency Liquidity Assistance In 2012, the amount of ELA provided 
286 to Laiki reached around 60% of the GDP. ELA continued to be provided to 
287 Laiki even though it was clear by 2012 that the bank was insolvent. Given that 
288 already since July 2012 the ECB had offered an opinion that resolution might be 
289 preferable for Laiki, one wonders how the CBC allowed ELA to reach 60% of 
290 GDP. The assertion of the governor of the central bank of Cyprus at the time, 
291 Panicos  Demetriades,  that  Laiki  was  ‘dynamically  solvent’  conditional  on  a 
292 program being signed, is not convincing given that the program was not signed 
293 until March 2013, nine long months after ELA was extended to an insolvent 
294 bank.42 
 
295 2.1.3.3 Merge of Greek and Cypriot Operations of Laiki The conversion of the 
296 Greek operations of Laiki from ‘subsidiary’ to ‘branch’ status in March 2011 
297 moved regulatory responsibility from the Central Bank of Greece to the Central 
298 Bank of Cyprus.43  That meant that the Greek operations of Laiki did not benefit 
299 from the liquidity assistance that Greek banks benefited from post-PSI. While 
300 bringing the cross-border operations of the bank under the supervision of the 
301 Bank  of  Cyprus  was  thought  to  be  a  positive  step  for  ensuring  proper 
302 supervision of the bank as a whole, it later became clear that this had increased 
303 the systemic risk in Cyprus. In particular, it is argued that it materially increased 
304 the funding required to bail out Laiki Bank,44  given that following the merger, 
305 the CBC’s Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) required Laiki to 
306 hold € 1.56 billion of additional capital against its sovereign bond portfolio, and 
307 € 2.1  billion  against  its  loan  portfolio—51%  of  which  was  concentrated  in 
308 Greece. 
309 While Alvarez & Marshal, a forensic experts firm solicited to investigate the 
310 matter by the CBC, found that it was the legislation that should be amended because 




40FL01    40   European Commission (2013). 
41FL01    41   Michaelides (2014). 
42FL01    42   Michaelides (2014), p. 673; Orphanides (2013) argues that the delays in asking for assistance were due 
42FL02    to the communist government at the time not wanting to impose structural changes. 
43FL01    43   The recapitalization exercises and European decisions do require recapitalization of either subsidiaries 
43FL02    or branches to happen at the group level, as decided at the PSI October 2011 meeting (para. 4 in annex 2): 
43FL03    ‘National supervisory authorities […] must ensure that banks’ plans to strengthen capital […] [take] into 
43FL04    account current exposure levels of the group including their subsidiaries in all Member States…’. 
44FL01    44   Which the Cypriot government provided with a surge of € 2.5 billion following the losses sustained by 
44FL02    the PSI 
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312 convert an existing foreign subsidiary into a branch,45  it is argued that had the CBC 
313 exercised its discretion with the minimization of the costs of the potential resolution 
314 of the bank in the future and had the CBC been a truly independent institution free 
315 from  regulatory capture,  political  pressures  and  bank  lobbying, it  would  have 
316 intervened to stop the merger. This is especially clear when considering the warning 
317 that the Central Bank of Greece issued to the CBC prior to the finalization of the 
318 merger in March 2011 about the Greek subsidiary’s concentration and credit risk, 
319 and the control weaknesses identified during its SREP review on the 31 December 
320 2009 data. 
321 Following the above observation and the remarks of the Alvarez & Marshal 
322 report, it is suggested that the reduction of restructuring options available in the 
323 case of insolvency because of a merger should be of chief consideration for the 
324 supervisor in approving the deal since the supervisor ‘should always consider the 
325 full implications of any actions taken by the institutions it regulates, in relation 




328 2.1.3.4 The Greek PSI and Delays in Requesting Assistance This section argues 
329 that the CBC could have done more with regards to managing and reducing the 
330 BoC’s and Laiki’s high concentration to Greek Governmental Bonds (GGBs) prior 
331 to the Greek PSI. Despite acknowledging that the local banking laws did not set 
332 out formal asset concentration limits—meaning that the BoC’s and Laiki’s high 
333 concentration of GGBs within their sovereign bond portfolio was not in breach of 
334 any regulatory limits47  —the CBC’s actions with regards to managing a situation 
335 which later  incurred a  number of  fines for regulatory breaches by the  Cyprus 
336 Securities   and   Exchange   Commission  (CySEC),48     are   regarded   as   largely 
337 insufficient.49   This  is  because  while  the  CBC  formally  requested  information 





45FL01    45   Alvarez & Marshal (2013b). 
46FL01    46   Ibid., p. 13. 
47FL01    47   Alvarez & Marshal (2013a), para. 2.9.2. 
48FL01    48   Both BoC and Laiki  officials incurred substantial fines by the  Cyprus Securities  and Exchange 
48FL02    Commission (CySEC) for their actions with regards to GGBs breaching: the ‘Peq9i  sxm Pqa9nexm 
FL0  Pqorx9 pxm pot  jase9votm  elpirsetsije91  pkgqouoq9ie1  jai sxm Pqa9nexm  Veiqacx9 cgrg1 sg1 
FL0  Acoqa91 (Jasa9vqgrg1 sg1 Acoqa91) Mó lot o M.116(I)/2005 (Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 
48FL05    Law),  the  ‘Peq9i  sxm Pqotpohe9rexm  Diaua9meia1  (Jimgse91  An9ie1  pqo1 Diapqacla9setrg  re 
FL0  Qthlifó lemg Acoqa9) Mó lot o M.190(I)/2007 (Securities Transparency Law), and the ‘Peq9i Dgló ria1 
FL0  Pqoruoqa91 jai Emgleqxsijot9 Deks9iot Mó lot o M.114(I)/2005 (Prospectus Law). Cyprus Securities 
48FL08    and Exchange Commission (2014), p. 3. 
49FL01    49   Alvarez & Marshal (2013a), para. 2.9. 
50FL01    50   Alvarez & Marshal (2013a), para. 2.8.1.3, referring to a letter dated 01/03/2010 sent by Mr Poullis 
50FL02    (Senior Director in Bank Supervision and Regulation of the CBC) to Cypriot Banks (including BOC) 
50FL03    regarding exposures to Government Bonds, and in particular GGBs requesting information on the strategy 
50FL04    of investing in GGBs and the risk mitigation measures taken 
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339 its written request on a timely basis51  even though it received no response from 
340 the BoC.52 
341 Michaelides suggests that, once again, political pressures from both the ECB and 
342 from  Greek  politicians  seem  to  have  influenced  the  CBC  from  taking  more 
343 appropriate action such as forcing the BoC and Laiki to dispose of their GGBs in a 
344 timely manner.53  He cites fear for any negative consequences such action would 
345 have  on  the  position  of  Cyprus  in  the  diplomatic  sphere  as  a  cause  of  the 
346 inaction54—even though ex post it is evident that such considerations are immaterial 
347 given the scale of the increase of the losses from 2010 to October 2011 (when the 
348 PSI terms were agreed upon). 
349 Regardless of whether or not the CBC should have requested the sale of the 
350 Greek Governmental Bonds prior to the PSI, it is undisputable that it should have 
351 asked for support for its affected banks immediately after the PSI took place either 
352 through ESM assistance, or for restructuring the banks. The Greek debt holdings 
353 were publicly disclosed in the July EBA stress test so everyone could calculate what 
354 the haircut meant for the Cypriot banks. With the Cypriot government out of the 
355 markets,55   it was obvious that it would be impossible for the Cypriot banks to 
356 recover from the PSI and rebuild their capital base within 9 months as required. 
357 Nevertheless, Cyprus did not ask for assistance until the end of June 2012. In 
358 addition, the government did not negotiate a program until November 2012, when 
359 the ECB threatened to cut off liquidity, and did not conclude a Memorandum of 
360 Understanding (MOU) until December 201256—more than a year after the PSI’s 
361 terms were agreed upon.57 
362 It follows from all the above that while crises are very difficult to predict,58  the 
363 Cypriot  authorities failed  to  detect  obvious  indicators  signalling  the  imminent 
364 crisis,59   and failed to act expediently and instrumentally in the face of political 
365 short-termism and delays in  producing the  reports on the  financial position of 
 
 
51FL01    51   Ibid., para. 2.8.1.4, reporting that a follow-up to the letter of 01/03/2010 was eventually sent to the 
51FL02    BoC in February 2012—two years later. 
52FL01    52   Ibid., citing the report of the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (2012) which highlighted 
52FL02    that only a verbal conversation took place between ‘someone’ at BoC and the Governor of the CBC in 
52FL03    response to the letter of 01/03/2010, and that the Board of Directors at BoC were never made aware of the 
52FL04    letter. 
53FL01    53   See Michaelides (2014), p. 669 noting that ‘ECB President Trichet was very vocal against a Greek PSI, 
53FL02    and one wonders what the response would have been if a central bank of a Euro-Area country advised, or 
53FL03    forced, the sale of Eurozone sovereign bonds’. 
54FL01    54   Ibid. 
55FL01    55   Orphanides (2013), p. 4. 
56FL01    56   Orphanides (2013), p. 5. 
57FL01    57   The PSI terms had been agreed on since October 2011and the PSI took effect since April 2012. See 
57FL02    Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance (2012), PSI Launch, press release 21 February for the final 
57FL03    settlement of the PSI, see Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Finance 2012: press release 25 April. 
58FL01    58   Clerides (2015). See Pashardes and Pashourtidou (2013), p. 22; not in the context of Cyprus, see Boyd 
58FL02    et al. (2005). 
59FL01    59   Clerides (2015), pp. 18, 24 noting that such indicators include widening current account deficits, rapid 
59FL02    growth in domestic credit, inflated asset prices (property or equity) and non-performing loans. 
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366 Cyprus and its banking sector60   stalling the negotiations61   and leaving the vast 
367 domestic imbalances unaddressed.62 
368 These delays vastly aggravated the situation. It is indicative just to note that 
369 while the first draft adjustment program foresaw a total fiscal adjustment of 5.75% 
370 of GDP in July 2012, by the time a program was agreed in March 2013 the required 
371 adjustment had increased to 12% of GDP. This was despite the fact that a major part 
372 of the recapitalization was covered by the ‘internal rescue’ of the bank done through 
373 the  bail-in  and  write-down  of  shareholders,  bondholders  and  the  uninsured 
374 depositors of Laiki Bank and Bank of Cyprus (the two resolved and restructured 
375 banks).63  Effectively, by delaying reaching a deal, a substantial amount of deposits 
376 had left the banking system, meaning that the haircut was higher for the deposits 
377 that  stayed  behind.  All  of  the  above  increased  the  haircut  on  the  remaining 
378 depositors within the Cypriot banking system. 
379 Given  these facts,  the  crucial  importance of  supervision in  determining the 
380 eventual cost of a potential resolution is undisputable. Indeed, commentators have 
381 argued  that  if  more  appropriate  policy  action  was  taken  earlier,  perhaps  with 
382 increased responsibility from the outside by a more experienced and less prone to 
 
60FL01    60   It is indicative to note that Cyprus asked for help (25 June 2012) at about the same time as Spain (21 
60FL02    May 2012). While Spain’s stress tests took two months to complete altogether (Oliver Wyman completed 
60FL03    a top-down stress test for Spain’s banking system within one month (21 May 2012 to 21 June 2012) and 
60FL04    the bottom-up stress test was completed by September 2012) in Cyprus, the PIMCO analysis was not 
60FL05    officially submitted until February 2013—8 painful months afterwards. 
61FL01    61   Eighteen months as opposed to the two and three week-timelines that other assistance requesting 
61FL02    countries  experienced  like  Greece,  Portugal,  Ireland  and  Spain,  see  Michaelides  (2014),  p.  643; 
61FL03    Orphanides (2013), p. 4 in fact argues that if the ECB had suspended its rules making non-investment 
61FL04    grade  sovereign debt  ineligible  for  collateral  following the  downgrading of  sovereign debt  below 
61FL05    investment grade in late June 2012 (as it had done for the cases of Greece, Portugal and Ireland) Cyprus 
61FL06    banks could continue to buy treasury bills and continue financing the needs of the country for some time 
61FL07    aggravating further their own financial position. That was a way for the ECB to strong arm the Cypriot 
61FL08    government to make structural adjustments and fiscal adjustments and by that point in June, get into a 
61FL09    program. 
62FL01    62   See Clerides (2014), explaining that ‘for four consecutive years, 2007-2010, the external balance 
62FL02    deficit was at or exceeded 10%’—an extraordinarily high level of deficits that should have alarmed the 
62FL03    authorities well before the crisis hit. ‘By the time assistance was sought public deficit rose to 6.3% of 
62FL04    GDP and public debt increased to 86% of GDP.’ In 2013, the public debt rose further due to recapitalizing 
62FL05    the Co-operative Bank by injecting € 1.5 billion of capital—equivalent to almost 10% of GDP. See 
62FL06    ICFCBS (2013), p. 26 noting that ‘this failure was reinforced by surprisingly encouraging reports from 
62FL07    the international agencies which scrutinized Cyprus’ financial condition’ For instance, as late as February 
62FL08    2011, the IMF’s Art. IV report on Cyprus concluded that ‘The Cypriot banking system has weathered the 
62FL09    economic difficulties well and appears to be in sound overall condition. It has benefited from reliance on 
62FL10    deposits rather than less stable sources of financing, conservative lending practices, close attention to 
62FL11    capital and liquidity buffers, and vigilant supervision. These factors have helped shield the banking 
62FL12    system from the pressures that are prevalent in many other countries. The ongoing risks in international 
62FL13    financial  markets  call  for  a  continuation  of  conservative  balance  sheet  management  and  careful 
62FL14    supervision.’ This striking conclusion gave the authorities considerable comfort at the time.; One can 
62FL15    argue that perhaps such misleading conclusions would have been avoided if asset quality reviews and 
62FL16    stress tests such as the one undertaken by the ECB in 2014 had been undertaken earlier, during a non- 
62FL17    crisis period and after having first specified the workings of recapitalization and resolution, especially 
62FL18    how to find resources for the recapitalization which is still a work in progress: see Orphanides (2015) to 
62FL19    that regard, and Orphanides (2013), p. 4, quoting Mario Draghi. 
63FL01    63   Charalambous (2015), p. 25. 
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383 domestic  political  capture  supervisor,  such  as  the  ECB,  bank  resolution  and 
384 restructuring involving a creditor bail-in in March 2013 in Cyprus, could have been 
385 avoided.64   This is why the ECB and the SRB must push for formal resolutions 
386 universally, from the outset of the Banking Union. This can be done either by using 
387 a certain number of ‘sticks’ such as the ECB taking over the direct supervision of a 
388 less significant institution, having on-site inspections, or ultimately threatening to 
389 withdraw a bank’s licence, or it can be done by specifying a more concrete set of 
390 triggers for the use of early intervention measures by supervisory authorities65  that 
391 do not only minimise the cost of an eventual resolution, but also the probability of 
392 said resolution from ever materialising. 
 
 
393 2.2 Cost of Prevention: The Role of Early  Intervention 
 
394 Despite the aforementioned supervisory failures, the CBC did apply some early 
395 intervention measures by requiring additional capital of € 2.1 billion against its 
396 consolidated loan portfolio after the merger of the Greek and Cypriot operations of 
397 the bank, and it also did replace the board of directors of Laiki. However, these 
398 measures lacked the strength required—perhaps due to a misled hope of resorting to 
399 ‘shadow resolutions’,66 inducing procrastination. Fortunately or unfortunately, such 
400 shadow resolution never came.67 
401 To  avoid  the  procrastination of  supervisory action  observed  in  the  case  of 
402 Cyprus, the new supervisory regime caters for early intervention tools, such as 
403 appointing temporary administrators,68  which must be considered before consid- 
404 ering triggering resolution. The use of these tools is instrumental for determining 
405 whether or not resolution will eventually need to be triggered. 
406 The early intervention tools are entrusted with the discretion of the supervisory 
407 authorities based on a mixture of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ triggers.69  If certain threshold 
 
64FL01    64   See for example Clerides (2014), p. 32; ICFBCS (2013), p. 26; Orphanides (2013). 
65FL01    65   These triggers would be set by the EBA’s draft regulatory technical standards under Arts. 29(1) of the 
65FL02    SRM Regulation and Art. 27(4) of BRRD; or at least in a softer manner by empowering the SRB to issue 
65FL03    guidelines and instructions to NCAs to that regard under Art. 31(1)(a) of the SRM Regulation. See 
65FL04    Enriques and Hertig (2015), p. 161. 
66FL01    66   I.e. resolutions through private sales and acquisitions or bail-outs instead of resolutions under the 
66FL02    formal legislative framework, see Enriques and Hertig (2015), pp. 150-165 for an extensive analysis of 
66FL03    the costs and benefits of shadow resolutions. 
67FL01    67   Enriques and Hertig (2015), p. 164 concluding that such shadow resolutions should not be favoured 
67FL02    because they can harm the stability of a banking system: by exacerbating the moral hazard of the too-big- 
67FL03    to-fail guarantee, increasing in turn systemic risk; by weakening healthy banks; distorting competitions, 
67FL04    and; damaging the reputation of formal resolutions. 
68FL01    68   A  temporary administrator is  an  early  intervention measure (Art.  29  of  the  BRRD), under the 
68FL02    responsibility of the supervisory authority, and is not to be confused with a special manager who is 
68FL03    appointed in resolution, under the responsibility of the resolution authority. The temporary administrator 
68FL04    might cooperate or replace the bank’s management aiming to reach a reorganisation solution and re- 
68FL05    establish the safe and prudent management of the bank. The special manager is essentially the executor of 
68FL06    the resolution authority’ resolution measures. 
69FL01    69   See supra n. 16, quoting Boccuzzi in defining ‘soft triggers’ as entailing a supervisory evaluation of 
69FL02    actual or potential, current or prospective non-compliance with prudential standards, and; ‘hard triggers’ 
69FL03    as an approach based on predefined quantitative technical thresholds not entailing an evaluation. 
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408 values are breached, such as the infringement of prudential requirements70   the 
409 supervisory  authorities  may  intervene  and  impose  corrective  measures.  The 
410 intervention  however,  is  not  mandatory  and  the  corrective  measures  are  not 
411 predefined. Instead, they are left to the NCAs’ discretion. As such, this decentralised 
412 system for early intervention preserves the necessary flexibility and adaptability to 
413 cater for the peculiarities of any given case. At the same time, by basing the 
414 intervention on the breach of predefined indicators,71   this solution gives greater 
415 certainty and protects the NCAs from potential complaints.72 
416 While early intervention is beneficial for keeping a troubling situation from 
417 deteriorating and thus minimising the costs of an eventual resolution or liquidation, 
418 at the same time, it risks having the trigger being pulled too early. Triggering 
419 resolution too early can be a real risk in countries that have already experienced 
420 resolution and want to avoid a repetition of the past from unfolding. However, such 
421 early triggering of resolution can severely damage the state of a healthy financial 
422 institution. This was the case with the early intervention tools adopted in the case of 
423 the FBME Bank in Cyprus. 
424 FBME was a Tanzanian-based bank running three branches in Cyprus, which 
425 after allegations by the US FinCEN of connection with money laundering73  was 
426 promptly put  under  the  management  of  a  temporary administrator  pursuant to 
427 Article 29 of the BRRD, as per the CBC’s decision, to ascertain the financial 
428 situation of the bank. It is interesting to note that Article 27 and Article 28, which 
429 require the raising of additional capital and the removal of the bank’s management 
430 respectively, and which are meant to apply prior to triggering Article 29, were not 
431 adopted  in  this  case  showcasing  the  discretion  supervisory  authorities  hold 
432 depending on the situation they are facing. Shortly thereafter, Tanzania’s Central 
433 Bank took over  the  management  of  the  bank’s branches in  Tanzania  as  well. 
434 Subsequently, the bank’s licence was revoked, and an application was filed for the 
435 special liquidation of FBME Bank, the Tanzanian parent undertaking of the Cyprus 
436 Branch. 
437 All these early  interventions were taken ‘at  a  time  when FBME’s financial 
438 position [was]  sound  and  fully  in  line  with  all  relevant  capital  adequacy and 
 
70FL01    70   BRRD Art. 27 specifying that the trigger can be decided based on an actual or likely infringement of 
70FL02    capital requirements, e.g. due to a deterioration in the bank’s financial condition or a worsening of 
70FL03    liquidity and leverage levels, or NPLs and exposure concentration, as assessed on the basis of a set of 
70FL04    triggers  which  might  include  the  institution’s  own  funds  requirements. See  EBA  (2015c), for  the 
70FL05    definition of the triggers for applying early intervention measures—The Guidelines do not establish any 
70FL06    quantitative thresholds for indicators that could be perceived as new levels for regulatory requirements for 
70FL07    capital or liquidity but clarify that they are closely interlinked to the SREP assessment indicating any 
70FL08    threat to the viability of an institution including an actual or likely infringement of requirements in the 
70FL09    relevant EU and national implementing legislation. See EBA/GL/2014/13, 19 December 2014. 
71FL01    71   Ibid. See also Art. 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU (Capital Requirements Directive) which includes a list 
71FL02    of supervisory powers that competent authorities can apply at an early stage to address relevant problems 
71FL03    faced by institutions based on the results of ongoing supervision (e.g. their SREP assessment). 
72FL01    72   Boccuzzi (2016). 
73FL01    73   On 15 July 2014 the Financial Crime Enforcement Network of the US Department of Treasury 
73FL02    (‘FinCEN’) issued a Notice of Finding that reasonable grounds existed for concluding that FBME was a 
73FL03    financial  institution  ‘of  primary  money  laundering  concern’  pursuant  to  Section 311  of  the  USA 
73FL04    PATRIOT Act, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A. 
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439 solvency requirements of the European Central Bank’.74 Indeed, prior to the Central 
440 Bank of Cyprus’s (CBC) announcement, the FBME’s short term liquidity ratio was 
441 104%—sufficient to cover all depositors if required. However, because of the CBC 
442 and the US Treasury’s announcement, FBME started experiencing difficulties, for 
443 good reasons, in accessing financial markets via its correspondent banks. 
444 It is most intriguing that money laundering, i.e. one of the alleged justifications 
445 used just a year earlier for applying the steep bail-in in two badly capitalised 
446 banks,75 is now seen to justify intervention in a well-capitalised bank pursuant to the 
447 ‘infringement or potential infringement of the requirements of the relevant EU and 
448 national implementing legislation’ even in the absence of such indication in the 
449 overall SREP assessment of the bank,76  causing its financial position to deteriorate 
450 and thus opening the way for triggering resolution. 
451 In addition, a further word of caution is the possibility of masking ‘shadow 
452 resolutions’ through private solutions as early interventions, by relying on the legal 
453 provisions  stating  a   preference  for  pre-resolution  alternative   private   sector 
454 measures.77  This is particularly relevant for national competent authorities (NCAs) 
455 which are more likely to continue to prefer shadow resolutions, possibly in order to 
456 cover supervisory mistakes that might pre-date the Banking Union, due to national 
457 political pressures.78  That problem might indeed be intensified within the Banking 
458 Union when it comes to resolving smaller banks, which is still at the discretion of 
459 the NCAs (if resorting to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) is not necessary), as 
460 member states cannot anticipate weather their peers will opt for formal or shadow 
461 resolutions and no member state will want to be stigmatised as the one having 
462 formally failing banks.79 
 
 
463 2.3 Cost of Resolution:  The Role of Triggering Resolution 
 
464 In Cyprus, the restructurings and resolutions of 2013 were not triggered until a 
465 financial assistance program was agreed with the Troika (the Commission, the IMF, 
466 and the ECB) which had as a condition the restructuring and resolution of the two 
467 biggest banks in Cyprus. 
 
74FL01    74   This was announced in the bank’s website that is no longer accessible since the bank closed in January 
74FL02    2016. 
75FL01    75   This is to a great extent due to the vast presence of outside the euro are non-resident depositors. 
75FL02    Indicatively in 2012, 30% of all deposits in the banks were from non-residents outside the euro-area. Also 
75FL03    Cyprus became the second largest foreign direct investment into Russia and local professional financial 
75FL04    and legal services were used by Russian companies: see European Commission (2013), p. 5; As such, 
75FL05    regardless of whether money laundering was taking place the global public opinion was that the bail-in 
75FL06    would mostly involve Russian oligarchs’ money and not domestic savers’ money: See Avgouleas and 
75FL07    Goodhart (2015), pp. 12-13. 
76FL01    76   According to the EBA such indication of infringement is to be based on the overall SREP assessment 
76FL02    of the bank. See: EBA 8 May 2015, p. 3. 
77FL01    77   See Enriques and Hertig (2015), p. 160; BRRD Art. 32, Recitals 46 and 53; Arts. 16(1)(b) and 
77FL02    18(2)(b), Recitals 16, 260, 27A and 29 SRM Regulation. 
78FL01    78   See Enriques and Hertig (2015), p. 161. 
79FL01    79   Ibid. 
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468 This is no longer the case since resolution is meant to be triggered under the 
469 BRRD if a bank is deemed as satisfying three caveats under Article 32, namely: 
470 (a) the bank is failing or likely to fail (to be determined by the supervisory authority 
471 in consultation with the resolution authority);80 (b) lack of a reasonable prospect for 
472 an alternative private sector action—including supervisory action (such as early 
473 intervention measures or the write-down or conversion of capital instruments) that 
474 would prevent the failure within a reasonable time frame;81  (c) the resolution action 
475 is thought to be in the public’s interest.82 
476 While the triggering of resolution is on the resolution authority’s discretion83—in 
477 a soft-triggers-fashion, based on its evaluation of the lack of adequate private or 
478 supervisory measures and of the existence of public interest—the determination of 
479 whether a bank is failing or likely to fail is normally taken by the supervisory 
480 authority.84 Whether a bank is failing or likely to fail is dependent on a narrow set of 
481 parameters. Namely, that the bank infringes or might infringe the requirements for 
482 the authorisation to a significant extent, for example, its losses will deplete all or a 
483 significant amount of its capital; the assets of the bank are (or will become) less than 
484 its liabilities; the bank is not (or will not be) able to reimburse its debts or other 
485 liabilities as they fall due; the bank needs extraordinary public financial support.85 
486 In this way the ECB, as the ultimate supervisory authority, can potentially coerce 
487 NCAs in triggering formal resolutions by using the ultimate weapon in its arsenal: 
488 asking national authorities to withdraw the authorisation of the credit institution 
489 under  Article  14(5),  16(3)  and  ultimately  under  Article  84(1)  of  the  SSM 
490 Regulation, which  would at  the  very  least  discourage acquisitions for  shadow 
491 resolutions.86   Shadow resolutions are  thought to  distort competition  since they 
492 weaken healthy banks and increase systemic risk by intensifying the too-big-to-fail 
493 problem to the detriment of the overall stability of the banking system.87 
 
 
494 2.4 Cost of Resolution:  The Role o f  a Liquidation vs. Resolution Evaluation 
 
495 All three caveats for triggering resolution mentioned are based on the assessment 
496 that liquidation would have such disruptive effects that it might jeopardise the 
497 continuity of the bank’s essential functions, the financial stability of the banking 
 
80FL01    80   BRRD Art. 32(1)(a). 
81FL01    81   BRRD Art. 32(1)(b). 
82FL01    82   BRRD Art. 32(1)(c). 
83FL01    83   Of course the SRB’s decision has to be approved by the Commission. As such, the Commission is the 
83FL02    authority actually placing a bank into resolution. 
84FL01    84   The supervisory authority has all the information and expertise to judge the bank’s solvency, both 
84FL02    currently and prospectively. However, under Art. 32(2) the resolution authority can also determine the 
84FL03    bank’s solvency, in consultation with the supervisory authority (if the resolution authority is adequately 
84FL04    informed and capable). 
85FL01    85   BRRD Art. 32(4); See EBA (2015b) on the  ‘triggers’ which signal that  an institution shall be 
85FL02    considered as ‘failing or likely to fail’. 
86FL01    86   See Enriques and Hertig (2015), pp. 161-163 for a more extensive account of the available options that 
86FL02    the ECB and the SRB have to coerce national authorities into applying formal resolutions. 
87FL01    87   Ibid. 
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498 system or the pursuit of other significant public interests,88  and as such, should be 
499 avoided (resolution should be preferred). 
500 It follows that the comparison of liquidation’s effects against resolution’s effects 
501 is of core importance in deciding to trigger resolution, and, clearly, for determining 
502 the eventual costs of dealing with the troubled institution as well as for determining 
503 whether the creditors are better off in resolution than under ordinary liquidation. 
504 This is  especially the  case  if  the  adoption of  the  Deposit Guarantee  Schemes 
505 Directive leads to a restrictive interpretation of the instances in which the DGS 
506 could be used outside ordinary liquidation.89  However, assessing whether resolution 
507 or  liquidation  is  more  appropriate  can  be  very  difficult  given  that  it  entails 
508 calculating losses that have not yet occurred and quantifying systemic risk—an un- 




511 2.4.1 Which Comes First? Liquidation or Resolution? 
 
512 The  matter  of  whether resolution or  liquidation  should be considered first has 
513 attracted considerable confusion91  because they both have the same starting point, 
514 namely that the bank is failing or is likely to fail with no realistic alternative 
515 solutions to remedy it.92  This may cause one to think that the two alternatives are to 
516 be considered simultaneously. 
517 Confusion is  further  compounded by  the  fact  that  the  decisive  element  for 
518 choosing between the two appears to be that the resolution is thought to be in the 
519 ‘public  interest’.  I.e.  it  ‘achieves  and  is  proportionate to  one  or  more  of  the 
520 resolution objectives specified in Article 31’—such as ensuring the continuity of 
521 essential functions, maintaining the stability of the  financial system, protecting 
522 depositors  etc.—where  ordinary  insolvency  proceedings  would  not  meet  said 





88FL01    88   BRRD conditions for placing a bank in resolution. 
89FL01    89   See Boccuzzi (2016). 
90FL01    90   Krahnen and Moretti (2015), pp. 125-126. 
91FL01    91   Practical experience with resolution in the case of Cyprus seems to favour the position that resolution 
91FL02    comes before liquidation as a form of early intervention measure as noted below in the same section. This 
91FL03    practice seems to corroborate the observations of Boccuzzi (2016). However, the BRRD (Recitals 45-46), 
91FL04    the SRMR (Recital 59), the EBA (2014a), p. 3, and EBA (2014b), p. 10, take the opposite view. Also to 
91FL05    that effect, the bad bank-good bank separation tool, can only be used if liquidation of the assets through 
91FL06    ordinary insolvency proceedings could negatively impact financial markets and if the transfer is deemed 
91FL07    necessary to ensure the correct functioning of the bank under resolution (or of the bridge bank) or for 
91FL08    maximising the proceeds of liquidation. See EBA (2015a). 
92FL01    92   See Boccuzzi (2011), pp. 15-21; and Boccuzzi (2016), pp. 54-55 ‘insolvency or near-insolvency is a 
92FL02    more advanced stage of distress that can be defined as a profound alteration in the economic, financial and 
92FL03    patrimonial conditions of the bank, which requires appropriate and timely interventions to remove the real 
92FL04    causes and minimise its negative effects to depositors and other relevant stakeholders’. 
93FL01    93   Art. 32(5). 
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524 authorities  are  entrusted  with  considerable  discretion  to  prioritise  the  various 
525 resolution objectives,94  and thus determine the existence of a public interest.95 
526 This  confusion  could,  as  professor  Boccuzzi  points  out,  lead  resolution 
527 authorities to construe resolution as proceedings prior to liquidation, i.e. a form 
528 of early intervention to insolvency given that the effects of liquidation can strain 
529 public interest.96  If this view is to be followed, liquidation would only occur as a 
530 solution of last resort, when a restructuring operation is inadequate or unfeasible. 
531 Indeed, that appears to have been the case in the Laiki Popular Bank’s resolution in 
532 Cyprus where the resolution consisted of a mixture of the sale of vital parts of the 
533 bank and the wind-down of the rest of it under ‘special’97  liquidation.98 
534 However, the BRRD seems to take the exact opposite view. Namely, liquidation 
535 has to be considered first, and only if ‘the liquidation of those assets under normal 
536 insolvency proceedings could have an adverse effect on one or more financial 
537 markets’99    should  resolution  be  considered.100    To  the  same  extent,  the  SRM 
538 Regulation Recital 59 also suggests that liquidation should be considered first, and 
539 the  resolution option only  considered if  liquidation  would  impact  the  markets 
540 negatively.101 
541 In this author’s opinion, the answer to whether it is ‘better’ for liquidation or 
542 resolution to go first must be determined on a case by case basis. This is simply 
543 because while liquidation and resolution have the same starting point, they have 
544 completely different end objectives. Liquidation is primarily focused on safeguard- 
545 ing the creditors’ interests and deepening the pool of assets to be distributed to 
546 creditors. Resolution, on the other hand, is only interested with protecting depositors 
547 within the pool of creditors—specifically guaranteed depositors if the case of Laiki 
548 Bank is of any indication—and cares primarily for safeguarding financial stability 
549 and upholding the public interest. As such, in each case one has to decide whose 
550 interests are to be safeguarded in order to choose between triggering liquidation or 
551 resolution first. Simply put, the choice between liquidation and resolution must be 
552 made  by  determining  who  it  is  supposed  to  benefit.  And  then  one  must  act 
553 accordingly. 
 
94FL01    94   Indeed, Boccuzzi (2016), writes: ‘the reference to the effects on financial stability could suggest that 
94FL02    the size of a bank might be a condition for whether or not to start resolution.’ However, that is not the 
94FL03    only parameter since the other objectives are not necessarily associated with the systemic importance of 
94FL04    the bank and should stand in principle at equal significance. 
95FL01    95   Boccuzzi  (2016),  p.  170  noting  that  this  is  ‘albeit  on  the  basis  of  pre-determined  technical 
95FL02    requirements’. 
96FL01    96   Ibid., p. 169. 
97FL01    97   Instead of ‘ordinary’ i.e. the immediate realisation of assets. 
98FL01    98   For example, this is the case in Italy, see Boccuzzi (2016), p. 171. 
99FL01    99   Art. 42 para. 1 on the resolution authorities’ power to transfer assets, rights or liabilities. See EBA 20 
99FL02    May 2015, setting out three elements that should be considered by resolution authorities when assessing 
99FL03    the market situation for the assets concerned and the potential direct and indirect effects on financial 
99FL04    markets: (a) whether the market for these assets is impaired; (b) the impact of a disposal of these assets on 
99FL05    the markets where they are traded; (c) the situation of the financial markets and the direct and indirect 
99FL06    effects of an impairment on the markets for these assets. 
100FL01    100    BRRD Art. 42(14), Recitals 45-46. 
101FL01    101    See Boccuzzi (2016); Hadjiemmanuil (2015), p. 23. 
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554 2.4.2 Comparing the Losses of Liquidation with the Losses of Resolution 
 
555 Regardless  of  which  must  be  considered  first  (liquidation  or  resolution),  it  is 
556 essential that the losses under ordinary liquidation are compared against the losses 
557 of resolution, even if only after the resolution has taken place, in order to ascertain 
558 whether the creditors are indeed better or worse off than under ordinary liquidation. 
559 This element has received no attention in the case of Cyprus. Despite the fact that 
560 the bail-in tool was used, no evaluation of the cost of resolution as opposed to the 
561 potential  cost  of  ordinary  liquidation  has  been  undertaken  to  this  author’s 
562 knowledge—neither prior nor post the implementation of the resolution measures. 
563 As such, it has not actually been determined whether the creditors were in fact better 
564 or worse off under ordinary liquidation. 
565 The only studies of some relevance are an independent assessment by PIMCO 
566 which estimated as a base scenario total losses incurred by the banking sector by 
567 2015 at just under € 14bn,102  and Pashardes and Pashourtidou (2013) who provide 
568 estimates of output losses for the period 2012-2020 associated with the economic 
569 crisis in Cyprus, which can largely be attributed to the banking crisis. Nevertheless, 
570 none of these studies provide an estimate of the potential losses under an ordinary 
571 liquidation scenario. In addition, in the case of Pashardes and Pashourtidou, the 
572 losses  calculated  are  of  the  output  GDP—losses  also  caused  by  accumulated 
573 excessive public deficits, which undermined the role of government as guarantor of 
574 the  banking system, and structural weaknesses of  the  Cyprus economy, which 
575 limited the capacity of the economy to react swiftly so as to dampen the negative 
576 impact of the crisis.103   Despite being very relevant to the banking crisis as they 
577 limited  the  banks’  ability  to  raise  their  capital,  these  figures  might  still  be 
578 unsuitable  for  the  purposes of  comparing solely  the  losses  from  resolution  as 
579 opposed to a potential liquidation. 
580 While these studies are important, especially in evaluating the aftermath losses of 
581 bank resolution, more studies are needed to help determine whether the creditors are 
582 better or worse off, and under which scenarios the creditors would have been better 
583 off if different actions were taken. 
584 If there was ever truly a case where such an evaluation would be of absolute 
585 necessity, it would be the case of Cyprus. Apart from the complete disregard of 
586 creditor  protection  rights  that  often  carry  exceptional  gravity  in  liquidation 
587 proceedings, the eventual bail-in imposed was outrageously steep. While it is true 
588 that under ordinary liquidation the creditors should accept the probability that they 
589 might lose all their credit, resolution is meant to take place at a point prior to 
590 liquidation, presumably when the bank’s finances are at a better state. This author is 
591 at the very least unsympathetic towards just assuming that the resolution left every 
592 creditor better off than ordinary liquidation, without a proper assessment. As such, it 
593 is utterly disappointing that in its recent decision in the Ledra case the European 
 
102FL01    102    Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus Banking Sector (2013), p. 25; PIMCO (2013), 
102FL02    p. 16, para. 3.12. A more pessimistic ‘adverse scenario’ forecasts total losses by 2015 of € 18.5bn, 
102FL03    implying a capital gap of € 8.9bn. Losses of this order, which did not materialize in reality, would 
102FL04    amount to more than Cyprus’ total GDP. 
103FL01    103    Pashardes and Pashourtidou (2013), p. 18. 
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594 Court of Justice held that the ‘measures [bail-in] do not constitute a disproportionate 
595 and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of the appellants’ right to 
596 property’  partly  because  of  the  ‘imminent  risk  of  financial  losses  to  which 
597 depositors with the two banks concerned would have been exposed if the latter had 
598 failed’ invoking as such the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle of the BRRD without 
599 basing that conjecture on any material study of the potential losses that the creditors 
600 in question would have faced had the bank been liquidated. This is despite the fact 
601 that the judgement was delivered two years after the bail-in had applied.104 
602 On this point, determining the specific moment for evaluating whether creditors 
603 are better or worse off, is also crucial. Article 73 of the BRRD instructs that the 
604 potential losses of liquidation should be calculated as if the institution would have 
605 entered normal insolvency proceedings at the time when the resolution decision was 
606 taken and disregard any provision of extraordinary public financial support to the 
607 institution under resolution.105  However, having as a point of reference the moment 
608 in which the resolution is triggered for comparing the losses of liquidation and 
609 resolution could create the distorted incentive to postpone the resolution as much as 
610 possible so that the finances of the credit institution deteriorate to such an extent that 
611 liquidation would be of such detrimental consequences that resolution is always 
612 justified  and  no  compensation  is  ever  due  under  the  ‘no  creditor  worse  off’ 
613 principle. This outcome is perhaps foreseen by the  BRRD, which requires the 
614 resolution authorities to minimise the cost of resolution whilst pursuing resolution 
615 objectives, as the next section discusses. 
 
 
616 2.5 Cost of Bank Resolution:  The Role of the Choice of Resolution  Tools 
 
617 Overall, the resolutions and restructurings that took place in Cyprus included: a 
618 steep creditors’ bail-in including unsecured depositors (47.5% for BoC depositors), 
619 shareholders and bondholders (Bank of Cyprus, Laiki Popular Bank); bail-in of 
620 shareholders and subordinated bondholders (in this case 99% of the shares was held 
621 by the Republic of Cyprus and, as such, amounted to an indirect bail-out) to qualify 
622 for state aid prior to the 2016 entry into force of the BRRD (Co-operative Bank); 
623 state aid of € 175 million from Cyprus’ newly created resolution fund (Co-operative 
624 Bank); the split of good bank-bad bank (Laiki Popular Bank); the sale of a part of a 
625 bank tool (Laiki Popular Bank); the liquidation of parts of a bank while writing off 
626 completely all uninsured creditors, including uninsured depositors (Laiki Popular 
627 Bank); the  special  liquidation  of a bank (FBME); € 1.5 billion  public bail-out 
628 through ESM funds (Co-operative bank);106  and, private funding (Hellenic Bank). 
629 In addition, suspension of business, revocation of bank licence, and the appointment 
 
104FL01    104    Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v. European Commission and 
104FL02    European Central Bank (ECB), ECLI:EU:C:2016:701, para. 74. 
105FL01    105    This evaluation should be undertaken promptly after the resolution action has been implemented; 
105FL02    Similarly, this point in time is chosen for evaluating the extent of the detrimental effects of liquidation 
105FL03    for triggering the sale of business tool See Boccuzzi (2016), p. 91 clarifying that the no-worse-off 
105FL04    principle is met for the non-transferred assets if immediately before the transfer the assets would not be 
105FL05    better off under ordinary liquidation. 
106FL01    106    February 2014 on the basis of a restructuring plan. 
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630 of a special administrator (FBME), were sought to strengthen the effectiveness of 
631 resolution. 
632 This section focuses on the measures that attracted the most attention: the bail-in 
633 tool107  and the haircut of uninsured creditors and shareholders on such a vast scale. 
634 Bail-in essentially is the tool that grants the resolution authorities the power to 
635 unwind  a  distressed  financial  institution  by  allocating  losses  to  the  claims  of 
636 unsecured creditors and  converting debt  claims  to  equity. For  Laiki  Bank, all 
637 deposits over € 100.000 have been written down in full. For Bank of Cyprus, the 
638 holders of ordinary shares and debt securities issued by the Bank have contributed to 
639 the recapitalisation of the Bank through the absorption of losses by being written 
640 down.108  In addition, eligible uninsured deposits have been converted to equity at 
641 the shocking rate of 47,5%. 
642 It is argued that the choice of resolution tools for these two banks has maximised 
643 the costs of resolution for the bank’s creditors and, as such, that it contradicts Article 
644 31(2) para. 2 of the BRRD which requires the resolution authority, when pursuing 
645 resolution objectives, to minimise the cost of resolution. This argument is based on 
646 the fact that the level of the bail-in ultimately applied in the Bank of Cyprus was 
647 deeply affected by distorted incentives for avoiding compensating the depositors of 
648 Laiki, which led to a ‘strange’ choice of resolution tools for Laiki. In Laiki’s case, in 
649 order to avoid triggering the use of the deposit guarantee scheme,109   which was 
650 completely empty and would therefore have needed backing from the government 
651 which was also in a bad fiscal position,110  Laiki’s depositors were sold off to the 
652 Bank of Cyprus (the restructured bank) as part of its resolution. This sale was made 
653 through the issuing of equity to Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd (Laiki Bank), 
654 by the Bank of Cyprus, for the acquisition of certain assets and liabilities, including 
655 insured deposits, pursuant to the Sale of Certain Operations of Cyprus Popular Bank 
656 Public Co Ltd Decrees of 2013.111  Consequently, the depositors were not resolved/ 
657 liquidated with the remaining assets of Laiki and there was no need to compensate 
 
107FL01    107    See ‘Bail-in clauses’ 128 claiming that conceptually, the bail-in tool is the most important tool in the 
107FL02    BRRD. 
108FL01    108    Based on ‘the Bailing-in of Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited Decree of 2013’ pursuant of 
108FL02    ‘the Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Law, 2013’—both adopted after the decision to impose 
108FL03    bail-in for a going concern bank for the first time. 
109FL01    109    The deposit guarantee scheme law has existed in Cyprus since 2000. 
110FL01    110    Note that in the Icesave case the EFTA Court held that Art. 7 of the Directive 94/19/EC does not lay 
110FL02    down an obligation on Member States and its authorities to ensure compensation if a Deposit Guarantee 
110FL03    Scheme (hereafter ‘DGS’) is unable to compensate depositors in the event of a systemic crisis. See Case 
110FL04    E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland (Icesave), Judgment of the EFTA Court of 28 January 
110FL05    2013, para. 144; Hanten and Plaschke (2014), pp. 295-310, 295-296; Icesave, para. 149. The obligation 
110FL06    on EEA States was limited to providing for a mandatory and effective procedural framework for DGS, 
110FL07    including time limits for the pay-out, giving no conclusive evidence on the state aid issue which arises if 
110FL08    the public sector provides assistance to DGS at least for EEA states (under Art. 61 of the EEA 
110FL09    Agreement); Although the position of the sovereign on making up for lack of funds in deposit guarantee 
110FL10    is  contested, as  noted above, the  ruling in  Icesave referred to  the  European Commission’s view 
110FL11    indicating that prohibiting the state from stepping in to provide assistance in emergency situations of 
110FL12    exceptional gravity does not seem fitting: see para. 166 of the judgement referring to pp. 8-9 of the 
110FL13    Commission’s impact assessment in European Commission (2010) Staff Working Document. 
111FL01    111    Bank of Cyprus Share Capital Issue for Compensation of Cyprus Popular Bank Ltd Decree of 2013. 
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658 them through the non-existing deposit guarantee scheme. Instead, they maintained 
659 their  claims  by  being  sold  to  the  Bank  of  Cyprus;  a  sale  paid  during  the 
660 recapitalisation of the Bank of Cyprus and financed through a steep haircut on its 
661 uninsured  creditors.  Shockingly,  the   uninsured  depositors,  bondholders  and 
662 shareholders of Bank of Cyprus therefore essentially acted as the deposit guarantors 
663 for insured deposits of Laiki Bank, a bank that was being resolved/liquidated.112  To 
664 showcase the absurdity of this action, it is worth noting that  this was not the 
665 approach taken subsequently for the sale of deposits of the Cooperative Bank of 
666 Peloponnese to the National Bank of Greece in December 2015. In this case the 
667 tender was financed by the Greek resolution fund.113 
668 Furthermore, this was not the only measure that increased the level of bail-in 
669 to  be ultimately  applied. Another controversial measure was the cross-border 
670 element of Laiki’s resolution (arising from the prior merger of the Greek and the 
671 Cypriot  operations  of  the  bank  as  explained  in  Section 2.1.3.3,  which 
672 basically consisted only of the sale of the Cypriot branches operating in Greece 
673 at a massive undervalue. This excluded them as eligible liabilities for the bail-in, 
674 increased the losses instead of minimising them, and increased the amount to be 
675 written-down. Importantly, the € 15 billion deposits in the Cypriot branches in 
676 Greece were left untouched by being sold off to Piraeus Bank—for a big profit 
677 for the latter.114 
678 Bail-in is meant to recapitalise the failing bank itself, not depositors of other 
679 financial institutions. On the contrary, deposit guarantee schemes are meant to 
680 help provide liquidity and assistance in resolution, at least up to the point where 
681 they would be needed to compensate the insured depositors. In addition, the costs 
682 of bank resolution have to  be minimised as far as possible by the  Resolution 
683 authorities and their choice of resolution tools pursuant to the BRRD.115  However, 
684 that was not the way the regime was applied in Cyprus, leaving a big question- 







112FL01    112    Zenios (2014) explains why various stakeholders in the new Bank of Cyprus (BoC) were not treated 
112FL02    equitably by pointing out that ‘[t]he bailed-in depositors of BoC contributed € 3.806 billion in cash and 
112FL03    received 3.806Bn shares, i.e. € 1.00 per share. Laiki contributed net assets € 425 million and received 
112FL04    844Mn shares at € 0.503 per share. The capitalisation of the old shareholders of BoC was € 371.95M at 
112FL05    the time of restructuring and they received 18M shares at € 20.66 per share. If all stakeholders were 
112FL06    given shares at the same price in proportion to their capital contribution, the capital structure of the 
112FL07    restructured BoC would have been 82.7% bailed-in depositors, 9.2% ex-Laiki and 8.1% old BoC 
112FL08    shareholders. Instead, the current allocation stands at 81.5%, 18.1% and 0.4% respectively. This is 
112FL09    preferential treatment of ex-Laiki at the expense of old BoC shareholders.’ 
113FL01    113    See European Parliament, ‘‘‘Bail-ins’’ in recent banking resolutions and state aid cases’ (7 July 
113FL02    2016) PE 574.395, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/574395/IPOL_ 
113FL03    IDA(2016)574395_EN.pdf (accessed 27 April 2017). 
114FL01    114    Michaelides (2014), pp. 668, 674 writing that: ‘In March 2013, Piraeus Bank reported an one-off 
114FL02    capital gain of € 3.4 billion’ because of ‘regulatory arbitrage across valuation methodologies.’ 
115FL01    115    Art. 31(2) para. 2. 
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686 3 Success? 
 
687 The fact that Cyprus was the first country that applied the bail-in at such a great 
688 scale  and  has  managed  to  bounce  back  from  the  crisis  much  quicker  than 
689 expected—with the full lifting of capital controls in April 2015, having stabilised 
690 the total bank deposits,116  and having reduced its reliance on Emergency Liquidity 
691 Assistance (ELA) to € 3,3 billion from its peak of € 11,2 billion in April 2013117— 
692 has led many to praise the ‘success’ of the application of the bail-in tool. However, 
693 such praising of success should not be warranted so easily. 
694 In  reality, adopting the  unprecedented measure of  bail-in  to  such an  extent 
695 through an administrative action on an ex-post-factum legal basis (something that is 
696 now prohibited under Article 55 of the BRRD which exempts from the bail-in all 
697 liabilities issued or entered into before implementation of the bail-in in national 
698 legislation, and requires the creditors to contractually recognise that the liability 
699 may be subject to a write-down, conversion, modification or change in the payment 
700 of interest) has been detrimental to the confidence of all depositors, especially 
701 domestically, and not just of those affected by the bail-in. The resentment that the 
702 application of bail-in created was magnified due to the unfair way the haircut was 
703 applied. In effect, the bail-in spared depositors in foreign branches and depositors in 
704 other  credit  institutions  in  Cyprus,  which  received  public  money  for  their 
705 recapitalization.118 
706 As such, different troubled banks were treated differently within the Cypriot 
707 banking system. Specifically, the Greek branches of the Cypriot banks were sold, 
708 and  the  bank  that  acquired  them  was  recapitalized  with  European  Stability 
709 Mechanism funds. The  Cypriot operations of  Laiki  and  Bank of  Cyprus were 
710 merged. This involved a partial and complete bail-in of the Bank of Cyprus’ and 
711 Laiki’s uninsured depositors respectively. On  the  other hand, the  Co-operative 
712 societies and the Cypriot part of Hellenic Bank (the third largest bank) were bailed 
713 out with money given to Cyprus on the condition that the bail-in would be applied 
714 for Laiki Bank and the Bank of Cyprus.119  In addition, different creditors were also 
715 treated  differently  even  within  the  restructured/resolved  banks,  and  creditor 
716 seniority was not respected. For instance, the bail-in gave preferential treatment 
717 to ELA creditors (€ 9 billion, around 60% of GDP) of Laiki Bank120   who were 
 
 
116FL01    116    With an increase of € 2 billion in deposits in 2016 compared to the end of 2013, reaching € 49.1 
116FL02    billion. See Speech of the governor of the central bank of Cyprus; The capital controls were enforced 
116FL03    under The Enforcement of Restrictive Measures on Transactions in case of Emergency Law of 2013, 
116FL04    Law 12(I) of 2013 (the Restrictive Measures Law), which sets the legal framework under which the 
116FL05    Minister of Finance, on the governor of the CBC’s recommendation, issues decrees restricting certain 
116FL06    transactions for the purposes of protecting the stability of deposits in Cyprus banks following the 
116FL07    adoption of bail-in measures in the course of resolution of two of the Cyprus banks in 2013. 
117FL01    117    € 3.3 billion in March 2016, from € 3.8 billion at the end of 2015 and from € 11.2 billion in April 
117FL02    2013. 
118FL01    118    Charalambous (2015), p. 33; ICFCBS (2013). 
119FL01    119    Michaelides (2014), p. 674. 
120FL01    120    See  supra  n.  112,  using  Zenios’s (2014)  numerical  explanation  of  why  treatment  of  various 
120FL02    stakeholders in the new Bank of Cyprus (BoC) was not equitable. 
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718 transferred, along with the guaranteed deposits to the Bank of Cyprus, over the 
719 unguaranteed depositors. In addition, an interesting legal point is the fact that since 
720 the resolution regime as we know it today was not in place in 2013, the fact that the 
721 deposit guarantee scheme was not involved makes the disproportionate burden- 
722 sharing placed on unguaranteed depositors for the benefit of guaranteed depositors, 
723 strange. Why were the uninsured depositors less senior than insured depositors if the 
724 deposit guarantee was not triggered?121  Since the uninsured depositors were not less 
725 senior, it is argued that the principle of proportionality—that all depositors be 
726 treated equally as senior creditors—should had been applied.122   Instead, creditor 
727 priority was completely circumvented further increasing a sentiment of injustice. 
728 The said negative sentiments created fear of a wide-scale bank run which led to 
729 the  imposition  of  strict  capital  controls  limiting  the  amounts  that  could  be 
730 withdrawn from the  Bank of  Cyprus up until  April 2015, two years after  the 
731 triggering of the resolution and restructuring in the affected banks. This led to the 
732 argument that to avoid bank runs in the absence of capital controls, future bail-ins 
733 should avoid the inclusion of retail depositors. 
734 However, that would not have ensured the effective recapitalisation of the bank 
735 in the case of the Bank of Cyprus, as this had a narrow capital structure.123  It is 
736 indicative just to note that post-resolution, bailed-in depositors hold around 81% of 
737 the Bank’s share capital, while the outstanding ordinary shares as of 29 March 2013 
738 and the ordinary shares arising from the conversion of outstanding debt securities as 
739 of that same date, now account for less than 1% of the share capital of the Bank, 
740 highlighting the narrow nature of the bank’s capital.124  Narrow banking structures 
741 are quite common throughout different European countries whose financial systems 
742 tend to be dominated by banks rather than by the capital markets. A similar case is 
743 the case of Italy, although Italy traditionally had a much more developed retail 
744 bondholder base. 
745 In this regard, it is important to note that depositors were not the only creditors 
746 with deeply traumatised confidence post-bail-in. Retail investors were also severely 
747 hit. Indeed, the application of the bail-in has brought to the surface a wide range of 
748 alleged mis-selling and undue duress in selling of securities (the Greek word used 
749 literally translating to ‘value bonds’ (axiografa))  to retail depositors, who then 
750 became holders of CoCos which were converted to shares at the triggering of 
751 resolution and qualified in their entirety for the haircut that contributed to the bank’s 
752 recapitalisation.125  The same emerged in Italy after the bail-in of many shareholders 
 
 
121FL01    121    See Michaelides (2014), p. 676. 
122FL01    122    Ibid. This point is discussed further in Jack and Cassels (2013), p. 4. 
123FL01    123    Bank deposits amounted to four times the country’s GDP and the cushion between shareholders and 
123FL02    depositors was very thin. At the time of the rescue, deposits amounted to € 68bn compared to € 1.4bn of 
123FL03    bonds. 
124FL01    124    See Bank of Cyprus (2013) Recapitalisation through bail-in and resolution exit Bank of Cyprus 
124FL02    Announcement, available at http://www.bankofcyprus.com/en-GB/Start/News_Archive/ 
124FL03    Recapitalisation-through-Bail-in-and-Resolution-Exit-Bank-of-Cyprus-Announcement/  (accessed   20 
124FL04    November 2016). 
125FL01    125    See Michaelides (2014), p. 661. 
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753 and subordinated bondholders revealed that many retail investors had purchased 
754 subordinated instruments believing they were purchasing safe assets. 
755 This reveals that the exemption of retail depositors only, and not of other retail 
756 creditors, could create distorted incentives in increasing the creditors base to be 
757 bailed-in by convincing retail depositors to be converted to retail investors, creating 
758 as such a loophole in increasing bail-inable liabilities by the banks without shifting 
759 the burden away from clients who are essentially depositors. 
760 While  losses deriving from the  restructuring were covered by investors and 
761 creditors and  not by taxpayers, this universal loss of  confidence increased the 
762 funding cost, constrained credit availability, and fed bank runs both for depositors, 
763 and most importantly creditors and investors, thereby harming participation in the 
764 financial markets at a time that Cyprus savings market—both for personal savers 
765 and provident funds—had been deeply devastated by the haircut, and as such was in 
766 desperate need for rebuilding.126 
767 In an interview with the Financial Times, the former governor of the Central 
768 Bank of Cyprus, Athanasios Orphanides, argued that the increase in the cost of 
769 funding will not be limited to Cyprus. Instead it will affect ‘any bank in any [weak] 
770 country’—meaning mostly the periphery of Europe—by increasing divergences and 
771 making the recession in the periphery even deeper. He concluded, ‘similar to the 
772 blunder in Deauville with PSI that injected credit risk into sovereign government 
773 debt…[t]he governments have created risk in what before last week were considered 
774 perfectly safe deposits’ by including them in the bail-in.127 
775 In addition, the haircut and the sale of Laiki Bank to the Bank of Cyprus radically 
776 altered the shareholding structure of Bank of Cyprus, which now stands as the 
777 largest bank of the island with 81% retail  shareholders.128   As such, while the 
778 conversion of old shareholders into non-preferential shareholders, (i.e. shareholders 
779 without voting rights), might mitigate the moral hazard of leaving voting rights with 
780 the old shareholders, it also delegates the voting rights to likely unsophisticated 
781 stakeholders who used to be depositors and who might have no interest in being 
782 involved in  strategic decision-making or  in  altering the  manner in  which they 
783 finance  the  bank.129   This  is  indeed exemplified  in  the  case  of  Cyprus, where 
784 converted creditors were required to register for the first time with the Cypriot Stock 
785 Exchange in order to manage their newly acquired shares, proof that a lot of these 
786 individuals had no prior participation in the financial markets, arguably signalling 
787 their lack of financial sophistication. 
788 In addition, the merger of Cyprus Popular Bank with Bank of Cyprus leaves 
789 Cyprus with one very large bank controlling half the market, leaving the structure of 
790 the new Cyprus banking industry in a far from optimal state in terms of ensuring 
791 competition.130   This dominant bank structure risks over-concentration and loss of 
792 competition—essential parameters for setting the service quality, the cost, and the 
 
126FL01    126    See ICFCBS (2013); Orphanides (2013), p. 6. 
127FL01    127    Orphanides (2013), p. 6. 
128FL01    128    ICFCBS (2013), p. 28, para. 4.3. 
129FL01    129    Ibid. 
130FL01    130    Ibid., para. 11.19. 
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793 availability of important banking services such as business credit. As such, there is 
794 the risk that, once it has recovered completely, the Bank of Cyprus will dominate 
795 the market while simultaneously being ‘too big to fail’, presenting Cyprus with ‘the 
796 worst of both worlds’ in harming competition and financial stability.131 
797 Therefore, although the Asset Quality Review (AQR),132 the early withdrawal from 
798 the ESM program, and the higher setting of the countercyclical capital buffer for 
799 O-SIFIs all seem to have contributed to the regaining of trust of international investors 
800 and foreign direct investment, the domestic stakeholders have not demonstrated the 
801 same belief and commitment.133   The lack of trust and co-operation of domestic 
802 stakeholders is evident through the persistence of the level of NPLs at 47%—the 
803 highest in Europe—which impedes lending by tying up a significant part of banks’ 
804 capital, despite the implementation of a new foreclosure and insolvency framework to 
805 pursue sustainable restructurings to minimise the problem. 
806 Apart from the fact that domestic stakeholders have been directly hit from the bail- 
807 in tool and the capital controls, they also have suffered from the effects of the 
808 diminishing competition in the banking system.134  Despite the low interest rates the 
809 banks  enjoy  in  Europe  currently, borrowing costs  have  not  been  reduced, but 
810 paradoxically deposit interest rates have not increased. A balancing act whereby 
811 deposit rates are set high enough to attract and retain deposits and low enough to make 
812 borrowing affordable, while also leaving the banks with a sufficient margin in between 
813 to service their capital, is essential.135   But it is a difficult task which arguably 
814 encapsulates ‘the theory of everything’ of banking: the need to stop deposit flight, to 




816 4 Conclusion 
 
817 Overall, while the resolution in Cyprus arguably can be seen to satisfy many of the 
818 objectives of resolution under Article 31 of the BRRD (i.e. ensuring the continuity of 
819 critical functions; avoiding significant adverse effects on financial stability; minimising 
 
131FL01    131    Ibid., p. 28. 
132FL01    132    In 2014, when the first data were collected for the AQR of the ECB, Cyprus was in the worst place 
132FL02    with 6%. Nevertheless, all its banks managed to pass the ECB’s stress testing by 2015, and by 2016 the 
132FL03    island managed to exit the memorandum, without having used, in fact, all of the money that it was 
132FL04    promised from the ESM. One can potentially infer from that that by following the resolution measures as 
132FL05    instructed, even with the massive lag by the Central Bank of Cyprus in placing the banks into resolution 
132FL06    and increasing their debt in the meantime (don’t forget that this is the pre-SSM, pre-SRM era) Cyprus 
132FL07    managed to recover, its banks managed to regain their investors trusts, in fact since 2013 Cypriot banks 
132FL08    have attracted the highest level of foreign investment in the history of the Cypriot banking system, 
132FL09    showing that by following the program strictly and being determined to recover might work after all. 
132FL10    Something that is not engraved in the Cypriot culture. 
133FL01    133    Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus (2016) State of Play of the Banking Sector in Cyprus, 
133FL02    available   at   http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf/26_05_2016_gov_speech.pdf  (accessed   20 
133FL03    November 2016). 
134FL01    134    Ibid. 
135FL01    135    ICFCBS (2013), p. 50, para. 10.7. 
136FL01    136    Ibid. 
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820 reliance on public funds; protecting guaranteed depositors and clients’ own assets), it has 
821 not done so in a way that transparently satisfies the general principles of resolution under 
822 Article 34 of the BRRD. In particular, it has not satisfied the principle that creditors 
823 belonging to the same class must be treated equally; the principle that no creditors shall 
824 bear greater losses than they would have borne in the case of the bank being liquidated; 
825 and the principle that safeguards must be applied for stakeholders who suffered worse 
826 treatment than under ordinary insolvency. 
827 Therefore, it is important to qualify what the ‘success’ in the ‘success story’ of 
828 Cyprus really is. The experience with bank resolution in Cyprus was successful in 
829 the  sense that  it  helped the  banking sector recover from a  deeply detrimental 
830 position. However, it was not successful in the sense of being optimal either in 
831 respecting the general principles laid down in the BRRD, or in minimising the 
832 immediate and long-term losses from bank resolution as illustrated above. 
833 Now the BRRD-style resolution is to be applied universally across Europe. This 
834 means that countries will have to put their banks through the resolution process 
835 without having the benefit of using such obedience to resolution to bargain for 
836 financial assistance, as in the case of Cyprus in 2013 and Greece in 2012, where 
837 private sector burden-sharing by creditors (‘bail-in’), and bank resolution, formed 
838 part of the financial assistance programmes.137 
839 This role of inducing compliance through financial assistance is arguably filled by the 
840 mutualisation of the national resolution funds under the Single Resolution Fund 
841 (SRF)138  under the new regime. The fact that, in the future, every significant use of the 
842 resolution fund (e.g. liquidity support exceeding 20% of the capital paid into the fund, or 
843 bank recapitalisation exceeding 10% of the funds and any decision requiring the use of 
844 the fund once a total of € 5bn has been reached in a given year) is under the responsibility 
845 of the plenary session of the resolution board, which has to decide with a two-third 
846 majority, means that every bank in need of SRF money to finance resolution will be 
847 subject to the Single Resolution Board’s control. Simply put, access to SRF funds is 
848 likely to be used to compel the obedience of the national resolution authorities— 
849 withholding as  such the  resolution funds in  a  quid pro quo fashion in  case of 
850 insubordination. 
851 Crucially, the  Cypriot experience with resolution highlights that  supervision 
852 should always work in concert with resolution in order to avoid output losses related 
853 to the banking sector’s size, bank recapitalisation costs incurred by the government, 
854 and to the amounts of liquidity injected in the banking sector by the central bank.139 
855 Supervision should be constantly evaluating how its decisions might affect the costs 
856 of  a  potential  resolution.  Resolution  planning  should  depend  upon  thorough 
857 calculation of the cost of each resolution measure to be adopted at the time the 
858 measure is applied, and on a longer-term scale.140   Arguably, the bank regulatory 
 
137FL01    137    See Memorandum of Understanding (2013), paras. 1.23 to 1.27. 
138FL01    138    Art. 67 of the SRM Regulation. 
139FL01    139    Boyd et al. (2005). 
140FL01    140    The public capital injected into EU banks over 2008-2012 is estimated to be in the region of € 413.2 
140FL02    billion, amounting to 3.2% of EU GDP in 2012 and the costs of bank rescue represented more than 10% 
140FL03    of GDP in Ireland, Greece, and Cyprus. See European Commission (2014), p. 74. 
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859 regime as it currently stands within the Banking Union can already be seen to be 
860 prescribing a holistic approach. Nevertheless, a more spelled-out approach—akin to 
861 that introduced by Article 31(2) para. 2 of the BRRD, which requires the resolution 
862 authority to minimise the cost of resolution when pursuing resolution objectives, 
863 and which requires both supervisory and resolution authorities to actively consider 
864 how their  decisions affect the costs and losses of a potential  future resolution 
865 throughout the  supervisory/resolution regime  in  the  Banking Union—would be 
866 clearer to that regard. 
867 Only after following a holistic approach to minimising costs and losses from a 
868 potential resolution from the outset, starting with supervision and early intervention, 
869 or  even  starting  with  choosing  the  capital  structure  of  the  bank,  can  a  true 
870 comparison of the cost of ordinary liquidation and bank resolution be undertaken; 
871 and not after a series of detrimental actions and inactions essentially removing the 
872 possibility to  truly choose between resolution and liquidation  by rendering the 
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